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ABSTRACT 
THE PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN IRAN 
 
The quest for democracy in Iran can trace its roots back to the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1907. However, Iranians have yet to 
establish a successful democratic government due to a combination of 
foreign interference and the lack of proper socio-political structures to 
accommodate such a transition. The generation born after the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979 is by far Iran’s best hope for finally realizing the goals 
of this century long struggle. In this paper I will argue that the legal structure 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, her politics, the demographics of the 
country, and the role of women how they are an integral part of the vitality 
of the Green Movement, all indicate that the necessary ingredients are 
present for successful democratic transition in the next decade or so.  
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Introduction 
The agreement reached between Iran and the six world powers of the P5+1 in the summer 
of 2015, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), sets relatively modest goals 
despite its arguably historic significance. The JCPOA regulates and limits Iran’s nuclear research 
activities in return for alleviating punishing sanctions that have hobbled the Iranian economy over 
the past decade.1 Yet the agreement has proven to be a hard sell to conservative audiences both in 
the U.S. and Iran. As such, debates over the merits of the agreement to regulate Iran’s nuclear 
activities have more often than not focused on the technical details of the JCPOA such as timelines, 
and inspection and enforcement mechanisms. To a certain extent there was also speculation about 
the hope that the JCPOA would lead to a broader rapprochement with Iran, and that in turn would 
turn the Islamic Republic into a more responsible international actor. 
There is another dimension of the consequences of a successful reintegration of Iran into 
the global community that has the potential to have far reaching consequences in the region: the 
effect on democratic development within Iran. Proponents of the JCPOA have alluded to the 
potential of decreased tensions to improve the horrendous human rights situation in Iran, and it is 
hoped that the success of the deal will strengthen the hand of the moderate/reformist elements 
within the Iranian regime.2 However, these projected benefits are often portrayed as ancillary and 
are not what the JCPOA was intended to accomplish. The Obama administration’s insists that the 
JCPOA is a deal “based on verification, not trust,” and that it doesn’t require a change of the 
                                                          
1 US Department of State, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, July 14th, 2015 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/ 
2 National Iranian American Council Policy, Memo Iranian Human Rights Defenders: Nuclear Deal is Good for 
Human Rights in Iran, , August, 2015 http://www.niacouncil.org/policy-memo-iranian-human-rights-defenders-
nuclear-deal-is-good-for-human-rights-in-iran/  
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domestic and international policies of the Iranian regime.3 These narrow expectations of what can 
come out of the JCPOA may make it easier to sell to a skeptical American public. However, I will 
argue that the JCPOA should only be a first step to a broader easing of tensions between, since the 
Iranian regime has a need for the existence of a foreign threat in order to justify its repressive 
policies. The more the level of the external threat is deescalated, the harder it will be for the regime 
to paint its critics as agents of a foreign aggressor. This will in turn make it easier for those within 
Iran who are seeking a more pluralistic and democratic society to push for the necessary change 
without being labeled as agents of the enemy. The prospects of the Islamic Republic turning into 
a liberal democracy in the near future might seem farfetched at first glance. However, as I will 
attempt to show in this paper, conditions within Iranian society are far more favorable to such a 
transition than at any time in the country’s over-a-century long quest for democracy.  
The history of democratic reform in Iran dates back to the early year of the 20th century, 
and its development can be broadly separated into three distinct eras. Iran’s Constitutional 
Revolution of 1906-1909 was a rejection of the manipulations of the colonial powers and the 
excesses of the ruling Qajar dynasty. The tenuous civil society that had emerged out of the reforms 
of the late nineteenth century marked Iran’s entrance into political modernity. However, the 
democratic aspirations of this movement were short lived and with the rise of the authoritarian 
Reza Shah Pahlavi instituted a new model of development within Iranian society. The Second 
World War ushered in a new era of openness to Iranian society after Reza Shah was deposed by 
the Allied powers to establish the Persian Corridor to supply the Soviet Union in their fight against 
Nazi Germany. Reza Shah’s son and successor Mohammad Reza Pahalvi did not have the same 
                                                          
3 Christopher Woolf and Carol Hills, “Iran Deal Not Based On Trust, Rather Verification, Says Obama,” PRI’s The 
World, July 14, 2015. http://www.pri.org/stories/2015-07-14/iran-deal-not-based-trust-rather-verification-says-
obama  
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authority as his father, leading to a period of national self-assertion that culminated in the election 
of Premier Mossadeq, only to be cut short by a CIA-backed coup in 1953. This marked the return 
of the strong state until the Shah himself was deposed as a result of the Islamic Revolution of 1979. 
The Revolution did not produce the democratic reforms its disparate groups of supporters had 
hoped for, as Ayatollah Khomeini established an Islamic theocracy with subordinate democratic 
elements. It is through these diminished democratic channels that today a myriad of social 
movements, such as the Green Movement, are attempting to put the country back on the path of 
the creation a democratic and pluralistic society.  
Iran’s young, educated and connected population is the main driver of democratic change 
within Iran. However, many are leaving due to a lack of economic opportunity as a result of 
international sanctions. Additionally, Iran’s declining population means that this window of 
opportunity for transition to a liberal democracy is quickly shrinking. Therefore, the success of the 
JCPOA at this juncture is crucial, as it lifts the most punishing sanctions and creates a viable 
economic future for young Iranians who can stay and push for change within Iran. Reengagement 
and reintegration therefore, is the best way to abet democratic reform within Iran. Nearly 70% of 
Iran’s population are under the age of thirty five. This population is highly educated and hungry 
to be connected to the world. A majority of college graduates are women, and they have been at 
the forefront of pushing for change within Iran. This population has matured beyond the uprisings 
of the late nineties and the late aughts. Despite the failure of those efforts to topple the clerical 
regime, Iranian youths have managed to bring about real positive, but incremental change in the 
face of brutal repression by the regime. 
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However, according to the International Monetary Fund, Iran leads the world in brain drain, 
with many of its recent college graduates choose to leave the country every year.4 While political 
repression and social restrictions do play a role in this decision, most are leaving due to a lack of 
economic opportunity. The devastating effects of the economic sanctions has had a 
disproportionate impact on young Iranians.5 If these exoduses were to continue at the current pace 
it will have a deleterious effect on the effort to achieve democratic reforms within Iran, as the main 
drivers of such change would be leaving the country in droves. This population is not being 
replenished either, as Iran’s birthrate has fallen below replacement level.  
In the first section, I will examine whether the Islamic Republic’s system of government is 
capable of reform by examining the constitution of Iran. I will demonstrate that while there 
certainly are mechanisms for bringing about democratic change, the unelected theocratic elements 
of the regime stand in the way of implementing such reforms. It should be noted, however, that 
these do not provide an insurmountable challenge to the cause of democratic reform. 
In the next section I will examine the role of the Velayat-e Faqih, or Guardianship of the 
Jurist which makes up the core of the ideology of the Islamic Republic established by Ayatollah 
Khomeini in 1979. The doctrine went through significant changes in the latter years of Khomeini’s 
time in power and this does provide some avenues for change, especially given the fact that a 
successor might have to be chosen to replace Iran’s current leader, Ayatollah Khamenei in the next 
few years. 
                                                          
4 William J. Carrington, and Enrica Detragiache. "How Extensive Is the Brain Drain?." Finance and Development 36, 
no. 2 (1999): 46-49. 
5 Djavad Salehi-Isfahani,"‘Iran’s Youth, the Unintended Victims of Sanctions,’’." Dubai Initiative-Policy Brief, Belfer 
Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Salehi-Isfahani%20-%20DI%20Policy%20Brief%20-%20Iran%20Youth.PDF    
(2010). 
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Then I will examine the political cleavages in the factional politics of Iran as they have 
provided an avenue for reformist groups to remain relevant even when they have been excluded 
from having any real power in recent years, through mass disqualifications of their candidates and 
other intimidation tactics employed by regime hardliners. 
Next we will look at what a civil society looks like in the Iranian context. The regime’s 
repressive policies have prevented the formation of strong civil society groups that might serve as 
competing power centers to its authority. Therefore, it is necessary to examine what can fill the 
void left in the absence of civil society, and I will demonstrate that social movements can fulfill 
the same function.  
The Green Movement, a loose coalition of disparate groups that came together to push for 
democratic change in the aftermath of the disputed 2009 presidential elections in Iran, is the most 
prominent social movement in the country right now. In the section on the Green Movement, we 
will examine the roots of the movement and how it can impact political discourse within Iran going 
forward. 
We will also look at Iran’s youth who not only make up the majority of the country’s 
population, they are also the main component of the Green Movement. While Iran’s youth are by 
no means monolithic in their political views, an examination of their educational attainment, their 
overall views on religion and gender equality make them a potent force for democratic change 
within Iran. I will demonstrate that Iran has passed the era of volatility that is often associated with 
a “youth bulge.” The forceful protests that happened from the late nineties until 2009 failed to 
dislodge the Iranian regime. While Iran’s population is still overwhelmingly young, it has matured 
to a point that it doesn’t see another revolution as a viable path to democratic change. Revolutions 
are inherently messy and unpredictable, and there is a great deal of revolution weariness in Iran. 
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Iranian democracy and human rights advocates see gradual reform as a much better alternative to 
achieve their goals. 
Finally, we will look at the important role Iran’s women have played in the democratic 
movement, particularly since the Islamic Republic came into existence. Their long non-violent and 
incremental approach to change Iran’s discriminatory laws has had a significant influence on how 
the Green Movement approaches its struggle for democracy.  
Iran has the many of the necessary ingredients to potentially to develop into a liberal 
democracy in the next few decades. This can happen through gradual reform or through another 
revolution. However, both of these paths are contingent upon the reform-minded Iranian youth to 
remain in Iran to push for the necessary changes. The lifting of the most damaging sanctions 
against Iran will improve the economic outlook for young Iranians, incentivizing them to remain 
in the country instead of fleeing. Additionally, imposition of further sanctions under a different 
guise, as has been suggested by some US lawmakers, will have the same damaging effect. Iran has 
the potential to develop into a viable democracy, but we should recognize that the window of 
opportunity is shrinking, and that creating a better economic future for ordinary Iranians is the best 
way to help them achieve that goal. 
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Is the Islamic Republic System of Government Capable of Democratic Reform? 
Before we can assess the prospects for democratic change in Iran, we must first examine if 
the Islamic Republic, as it is currently constituted, is even capable of reform. Any reform of the 
system requires a certain degree of buy in from the political elites. This is the main difference 
between a revolution and reform. In contrast to reform, a revolution will seek to change the 
political paradigm through replacing the existing elites. Whereas a revolution will attempt to 
completely supplant the ideology of the previous regime, reformists pursue their goals through 
reinterpreting elements of the dominant ideology in order to bring about the desired changes. The 
Iranian system of government can be democratic if the oversight of the unelected, Islamist 
institutions is eliminated or modified, and there is enough support among the political elites that 
reform (instead of revolution) is still possible.  
 The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran envisions a hybrid system of government 
that attempts to provide democratic elements (such as the direct election of the President and 
Parliament or Majlis) under the guidance of an Islamic scholar in order to ensure compliance with 
Sharia (Islamic religious law).6 It is an attempt to create an Islamic society and system of 
government based on Sharia laws while incorporating elements of modernity. The republican part 
of the Iranian constitution is based on that of the French Fifth Republic (with some significant 
amendments in 1989) and Article 6 of the Constitution states: 
The Islamic Republic of Iran has to be governed according to the general 
beliefs and decisions of the populace as expressed through voting; through 
the election of the President, Members of Parliament, and the councils and 
their monitors, or through referenda on topics which will be mentioned in 
other parts of this document.7 
                                                          
6 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Preamble, 1998 [1377] 
7 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1998 [1377] 
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  The Islamic part of the Iranian constitution is based on the philosophy of Velayat-e Faqih 
(Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) as articulated by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.8 However, 
the preamble to the Iranian constitution makes it specifically clear that it is an ideological 
constitution and “Islam was put into place as the dominant ideology in the in the constitutional 
documents.” 9 The combining of religion and democracy, while popular upon its adoption in 1979, 
has created such immense conflict that the system as it is currently constituted cannot survive 
without major changes and reforms. Even though the regime itself does not tolerate any open 
discourse that questions the nature of the Islamic Republic “the taboos on open discussion of the 
separation of religion and state have been broken.”10 There are mechanisms within the Iranian 
Constitution, such as a popular referendum or parliamentary amendments of existing law that 
would allow for such changes to occur, paving the path for a transition to democracy. However, 
the current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is unlikely to allow any path forward that 
would diminish his power or the Islamic nature of the Republic. What makes the proponents of 
reform hopeful a change can occur despite the current Supreme Leader’s steadfast opposition is 
that Ayatollah Khamenei will not be in office for much longer given his relatively advanced age 
(he is currently 76) and his failing health.11 
Figure 1 illustrates how the Supreme Leader (Vali-e Faqih), the religious/political post 
created according to Khomeini’s doctrine, can exert influence over all the elected and non-elected 
                                                          
8 Francis Fukuyama, “Iran, Islam, and the Rule of Law,” Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2009 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203946904574300374086282670  
9 Saiid Amir Arjomand, “Constitutional Implications of Current Political Debates in Iran” in Contemporary Iran, ed. 
Ali Gheissari (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009): 248 
10 Fatemeh Haghighatjoo, “Examining Iran’s Legal Structure” in Politics & Culture in Contemporary Iran, ed. Abbas 
Milani & Larry Diamond (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 2015): 92 
11 The Guardian, “Rafsanjani Breaks Taboo Over Selection of Iran's Next Supreme Leader,” www.theguardian.com, 
December 13th, 2015. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/14/rafsanjani-breaks-taboo-over-selection-of-irans-next-supreme-
leader  
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bodies of the Islamic Republic. The Supreme Leader appoints all twelve members of the Guardian 
Council who are tasked with vetting candidates and laws to ensure they are in compliance with 
Islamic Law and the goals of the Revolution. He also controls the military and national security 
apparatus as well appointing the heads of the state television (the IRIB) and the judiciary. It is this 
arrangement that short-circuits democratic institutions in Iran, and it is the first element of the 
regime that must be examined. It is necessary to examine the evolution of Khomeini’s concept of 
the Velayet-e Faqih, otherwise the political developments in today’s Iran would be unintelligible.  
Figure 1 
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The Doctrine of the Velayat-e Faqih 
 Ayatollah Khomeini was the leader of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and the main 
driver of his ideology was antisecularism. 12 A series of lectures compiled in Velayat-e Faqih first 
published in 1970, years before the revolution, Khomeini says that “it is part of colonial 
propaganda that religion should be separated from politics, that Islamic scholars should not get 
involved in political and social affairs.” 13 In another lecture, he tries to highlight the fallacy of the 
separation of religion from politics by posing a series of rhetorical questions harkening back to the 
early days of Islam when he asks “Was religion separate from politics at the time of the Prophet 
[Mohammed]? […] Was politics separated from religion during the time of Imam Ali?”14 
Khomeini saw the Velayat-e Faqih as a way to combat this trend and return Islam to its golden 
age. His goal was to implement Sharia law and give the clergy, as experts in Islamic law, ultimate 
authority over all matters of state in order to ensure that the government is run in harmony with 
Islamic laws. Even though Velayat-e Faqih was written and published long before the revolution,  
in the months leading up to the victory of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, he deliberately sought to 
deemphasize the vision of government he had laid out in order to present himself someone merely 
seeking to end the despotic rule of the Shah without any particular political agenda of his own. 
During the last leg of his long exile from Iran, while staying at the Neauphle-le-Château outside 
of Paris, he emphasized to foreign journalists that “In Islam we have absolute freedom”15, and “an 
Islamic government is a democratic state in a real sense”16, emphasizing that “in an Islamic 
                                                          
12 Arash Naraghi, “Ayatollah Khomeini’s Theory of Government” in Politics & Culture in Contemporary Iran, ed. 
Abbas MIlani & Larry Diamond (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 2015): 15 
13 Khomeini, Velayat-e Faqih, (Amir Kabir Publishers, 1981): 195 
14 Khomeini, Velayat-e Faqih, (Amir Kabir, 1981): 23 
15 Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye Noor, vol. 4, (Amir Kabir, 1981): 199 
16 Ibid., 190 
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Republic, everyone enjoys freedom of thought and expression.”17 Khomeini also declared that the 
Islamic Republic he envisioned would be the very same type present in Western democracies.18 
 At its height, almost 11% of the Iranian population from all political stripes participated in 
the 1979 Revolution, the highest in history, making it a “popular revolution” in the truest sense of 
the word. 19 The people were united in their opposition to the despotic rule of Mohammad Reza 
Shah Pahlavi whom they saw as a corrupt dictator, and someone who was beholden to the secular 
Western powers. Works like Jalal Al-e-Ahmad’s Gharbzadegi (Westoxification) made many 
Iranians predisposed to accept the kind of religious opposition figure Khomeini represented as the 
anti-Shah figurehead of the Revolution.20 The Revolution itself was not Islamist in nature given 
that it was by and large pluralistic, encompassing peoples of different classes, ethnicities, genders, 
and religions (including Christian Armenians and Iran’s native Jews).21 Put simply, the Iranians 
knew what they didn’t want (the Shah) and they were ready to rally behind a figure that offered a 
viable alternative. Many chose to ignore, or simply were not aware of Khomeini’s vision of an 
Islamic government headed by an Islamic jurist.22 Once the Shah was deposed, Khomeini made 
sure, through a series of shrewd and opportunistic political maneuverings, that the doctrine of the 
Velayat-e Faqih, and not a secular democracy (like he had promised in France) became the 
foundation of the new Islamic Republic. 
                                                          
17 Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye Noor, vol. 3, (Amir Kabir, 1981): 178. 
18 Ibid., vol. 3, 145 
19 Abbas Milani, The Three Paradoxes of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, http://www.mei.edu/content/three-
paradoxes-islamic-revolution-iran  
20 Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism, (University of California Press, 1993): 23 
21 Shahla haeri, “Women, Religion, And Political Agency in Iran,” in Contemporary Iran, ed. Ali Gheissari (New York: 
Oxford University Press 2009): 129 
22 Arash Naraghi, “Ayatollah Khomeini’s Theory of Government” in Politics & Culture in Contemporary Iran, ed. 
Abbas Milani & Larry Diamond (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 2015): 16 
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 Khomeini’s concept of the rule of the jurist rejected the separation of religion and state and 
during much of his rule, he implemented it based on what he had envisioned during his exile. His 
doctrine was made of three major components:  
- Sharia law is complete and contains everything needed to achieve happiness and progress. 
- It is necessary to control the state in order to implement Sharia law properly. 
- Proper implementation can only be overseen by an expert in Islamic law, therefore the ruler 
must be an Islamic jurist. 23 
However, this vision of government proved extremely problematic in addressing the 
exigencies of actually governing. For over a decade, the rate of economic growth was severely 
affected by political and social turmoil caused by a number of factors including: the revolution 
itself, which created a number of domestic political crises; legal uncertainties following the 
collapse of the old order; revolutionary justice; debates over property rights; the eight year war 
with Iraq; and international isolation.24 Khomeini himself was extremely uninterested in economic 
matters and dismissed such concerns as “foolish.”25 In 1988, after the war with Iraq ended, the dire 
economic conditions of the country could no longer be blamed on the deprivations of a war 
economy.26 Khomeini recognized that for his vision of government to survive him, the doctrine of 
Velayat-e Faqih needed to be fundamentally revised.27 In a drastic departure from his initial theory 
of Islamic government, where the state was restricted by the laws of Sharia, Khomeini now claimed 
that the needs of the government took primacy over Sharia. 28 He said that the practice of Ijtihad, 
                                                          
23 Khomeini, Velayat-e Faqih, (Amir Kabir, 1981): 25 
24 Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, Democracy in Iran, (Oxford University Press, 2006) 102-103 
25 Ibid., 103 
26 Ibid., 104 
27 Arash Naraghi, “Ayatollah Khomeini’s Theory of Government” in Politics & Culture in Contemporary Iran, ed. 
Abbas Milani & Larry Diamond (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 2015): 18 
28 Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye Noor, vol. 20, (Amir Kabir, 1981): 170. 
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the independent analysis of religious law, was too theoretical to meet the needs of the 
government.29 In order to preserve the established Islamic government then, the needs of the 
government, or the “secondary principles” (ahkam-e sanavieh), must take precedence over the 
“primary principles” (ahkam-e avallieh) of Sharia.30 There is a central paradox in this second 
version of the doctrine since it is required that all legal and political powers be subordinated to one 
individual who must be an Islamic jurist (the Supreme Leader), who can then overrule Sharia if it 
conflicted with the interests of the state (maslahat-e nezam).31 This created a theocratic monism 
that completely did away with the traditional dualism of religious and political authority that had 
existed in the Shi’a tradition. 32 While the first part of the new doctrine might be welcomed by 
traditional Islamic jurists, they might find the Supreme Leader’s ability to override Sharia (which 
in traditional Muslim scholarship is inviolable, no matter the cost) as extremely troubling. 
However, this also opens the possibility that the public interests might be able to supplant what is 
demanded by Sharia. While Khomeini’s interpretation of maslahat-e nezam does not exactly line 
up with what modern political language might consider as public interests, it does give proponents 
of reform within the Islamic Republic some room to maneuver. It is this second characteristic of 
Khomeini’s final version of the Velayt-e Faqih that subordinates religious law to some measure of 
human reasoning, and it might ironically lead to the secularization of the role of the Supreme 
Leader, despite the intentions of its creator.  
The philosophical foundation of such a transition can be found in the works of Iranian Islamic 
intellectuals such as Dr. Abdolkarim Soroush. Islamic intellectuals are Muslim scholars that seek 
                                                          
29 Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye Noor, vol. 21, (Amir Kabir, 1981):, 61. 
30 Ibid., vol. 20, 170 
31 Arash Naraghi, “Ayatollah Khomeini’s Theory of Government” in Politics & Culture in Contemporary Iran, ed. 
Abbas Milani & Larry Diamond (Boulder: Lynne Rienner): 19-20 
32 Saiid Amir Arjomand, “Constitutional Implications of Current Political Debates in Iran” in Contemporary Iran, ed. 
Ali Gheissari (New York: Oxford University Press 2009): 248 
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to present a new understanding of the religion that would make it more compatible with the 
requirements of modernity.33 Soroush offers an alternative approach to establishing a government 
in an Islamic society to the one offered by Khomeini’s Velayat-e Faqih. He presents his ideas in 
the broader context of reforming Islamic thought through the “humanization of religion.”34 He 
argues that Islamic Jurists have no privileged access to divine knowledge, arguing that “religion is 
for humans, not humans for religion.”35 This is a direct Khomeini’s claim that only an Islamic 
jurist is fit to rule because he is the only one who can correctly interpret divine law, thereby 
invalidating the need for the Velayat-e Faqih. 
Opposition to the Khomeini’s Velayat-e Faqih can be also found among prominent members 
of the clergy. The late Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, once the anointed successor to Khomeini 
who later fell out of favor and was replaced after he criticized Khomeini’s policies, called for a 
more liberal interpretation of Velayat-e Faqih, legalization of political parties, and a greater respect 
for pluralism in the Islamic Republic.36 He even went so far as to question the qualifications of 
Ayatollah Khamenei, Khomeini’s successor, a criticism that resulted in his house arrest until his 
death in 2009.37 Other critics from the ranks of the clergy such as Mohsen Kadivar, Ayatollah 
Jalaleddin Taheri, Mohammad Mojtahed-Sabestari, and Hasan Yousefi-Eshkevari, carried forth 
this criticism of the regime.38 The regime tried to silence these critics through arrests and trials, 
                                                          
33 Arash Naraghi, “Ayatollah Khomeini’s Theory of Government” in Politics & Culture in Contemporary Iran, ed. 
Abbas Milani & Larry Diamond (Boulder: Lynne Rienner): 23 
34 Ibid. 
35 AbdolKarim Soroush, "The idea of democratic religious government." Reason, freedom, and democracy in Islam 
(Oxford University Press, 2000): 128-130 
36 Geneive Abdo, “Rethinking the Islamic Republic: A ‘Conversation’ with Ayatollah Husain ‘Ali Montazeri,” Middle 
East Journal 55:1 (Winter 2001): 9-24 
37 Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, Democracy in Iran, (Oxford University Press, 2006): 135 
38 Farzin Vahdat, “Post-Revolutionary Discourses of Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari and Mohsen Kadivar,” 
Critique 16 (2000): 31-45; and 17 (2000): 135-157; and Mahmoud Sadri, “Sacral Defense of Secularism: The Political 
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but it only managed to amplify their dissenting voices, with the televised trial of Mohsen Kadivar 
becoming something of a sensation.39 
 While these philosophical discussions questioning the legitimacy of the concept of Velayat-
e-Faqih were useful in chipping away at the edifice of the regime, pragmatist reformers such as 
Said Hajarian, took on a more realpolitik approach. Hajarian, an adviser to the reformist President 
Mohammad Khatami, advocated for democracy and the separation of religion and state. However, 
he did recognize that “the balance of power within Iranian government is not in favor of” such a 
radical change.40 In order to achieve the goals of creating a democratic system, Hajarian opted for 
a constitutional approach. While the hardliners in Iran see the second version of Khomeini’s 
doctrine as to mean that the appointed Supreme Leader has absolute power and legitimacy, 
Hajarian favored a view that advocated for the election of all public officials, including the office 
of the Supreme Leader; and the powers of these officials should be limited to what is listed in 
Iran’s constitution.41 The Iranian constitution states that the Assembly of Experts (who are directly 
elected by the people) elect the Supreme Leader, and through their power of oversight have the 
authority to remove him at any point.42 However, the Assembly has never exercised its oversight 
mandate for two main reasons: the Supreme Leader appoints the Guardian Council who can vet 
the candidates for the Assembly of Experts; and the Supreme Leader also has the legal authority 
to dismiss members of the Assembly at any time, if he so chooses.43 Hajarian argues that this cycle 
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of impotent oversight can only be broken by mobilizing social forces from below in a strategy he 
summarized as “pressure from the bottom, negotiation from the top!”44 
 Khomeini’s doctrine of the rule of Islamic Jurist, controversial to begin with, has lost 
significant religious and political legitimacy separated from his charismatic authority. Ayatollah 
Ali Khamenei, the current supreme leader, succeeded to the office with very weak religious 
credentials, and even though he has expanded the powers of his office in a more authoritarian 
direction, he has had to constantly play political factions within Iran in order maintain his 
position.45 At this time there is no one with the religious authority or political backing within Iran 
to succeed Khamenei, who himself has been in failing health for several years. This has intensified 
the factionalization of Iranian politics, and it is an important development that might create some 
avenues for change in Iran’s future political landscape.  
Political Factions in Iran and Reform 
 Iran does not have political parties in the sense they exist in Western democracies. 
Involvement in Iranian politics requires fidelity to the core ideals of the Islamic Republic found in 
the constitution as interpreted by the Guardian Council.46 In this regard the Guardian Council was 
meant to work very much like the Conseil constitutionnel in the French system of government. 
Given the Islamic Republic’s Islamist ideology, all parties operating in Iran’s political system must 
fit within that spectrum, in effect eliminating political participation by non-Islamist political 
entities. The Guardian Council has never laid out the criteria for what makes a candidate or 
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political party sufficiently Islamic, and it rarely, if ever provides a reason for its decisions. 
Moreover, since candidates and political groups can be arbitrarily banned at any time by the 
Guardian Council, the process of party crystallization is not allowed to be completed. An 
ideological and authoritarian regime, such as the one that exists in Iran, has a vested interest in 
preventing the crystallization of political parties, lest they start to present a competing center of 
power. This creates a perennial arrangement of transitory and shifting alliances between different 
political groupings around certain political and economic issues. Therefore, it is more useful to 
examine Iran’s politics in terms of political cleavages. Hossein Bashiriyeh identifies cleavages as 
“relatively lasting or long-term and structural conflict lines that generate opposing political 
attitudes and preferences and divide people over a number of important issues (cleavage issues) 
for a rather long period of time, as opposed to shifting and temporary confrontations over 
secondary issues.”47 These cleavages are precursors to the creation of political parties, however, 
for the purposes of this paper we will focus on whether these cleavages can be exploited by 
reformists to facilitate the transition to a more democratic system of government in Iran.  
 Iran is an ideological state in that the ruling elites seek to shape every aspect of culture, 
society, and identity to match the tenets of Khomeini’s vision of an Islamic society. While the 
regime cannot be considered a democracy because of the Supreme Leader ability to override the 
democratic elements of the government, it is not by any means a completely authoritarian or 
totalitarian system either. The ideological drive towards the utopian vision laid out in the 
constitution promotes factionalism as the “pulsating heart of ideological states”48 since everyone 
has to operate within the confines of the dominant ideology. This is very much the case in a system 
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like the Islamic Republic where two main cleavages have emerged, and each has its own set of 
sub-cleavages that “provide the ground for shifting and temporary coalitions across the main 
cleavage.”49 During the history of the Islamic Republic these political cleavages have shifted over 
a variety of issues, ranging from the fight between secularists and Islamists in the early days of the 
Revolution, to socioeconomic and cultural issues that predominated especially after Khomeini’s 
death in 1989. However, all of these cleavages were working within the confines of the original 
ideology of the Revolution. It wasn’t until the election of President Mohammad Khatami in 1997 
and the rise of the reform movement that a new cleavage was created, “leading to some shifts in 
the ideological positions of parties and factions.”50  
 The rather hurried election of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to post of Supreme Leader after 
Khomeini’s death was in violation of the 1979 constitution that required the leader have a rank of 
marja’iyyat per article 107.51 The Constitution was retroactively changed to remove this 
requirement and expand the Assembly of Experts’ power to dismiss the leader in cases other than 
mere incapacitation. 52 Khamenei received all of his predecessor’s political powers and titles 
except for the title of Imam, making it clear from the very beginning that Khamenei’s weak 
credentials would not allow him to exercise the same type of charismatic authority that Khomeini 
had enjoyed as the founder of the Islamic Republic. Some of his promoters tried to encourage the 
idea of the Imamate of Khamenei in the late nineties but it was never successful and it faded 
away.53 In fact, for much of the nineties, Khamenei’s position as leader was overshadowed by the 
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strong presidency of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as he pursued a policy of neoliberal economic 
reform, privatization and reconstruction. Rafsanjani’s political machinations after the death of 
Ayatollah Khomeini were instrumental in Khamenei’s ascendance to the office of the Supreme 
Leader, despite his weak qualifications.54 Both owed their positions in the regime to the experience 
they had amassed during the revolutionary struggle, their management of state affairs during the 
Iran-Iraq war, and their close ties to Ayatollah Khomeini.55 Khamenei came to increasingly rely 
on conservative clergy and the ties he had built up with Revolutionary Guards Corps of the Islamic 
Republic while he was President during the Iran-Iraq war.56 These bonds were key when the 
surprise election of the reformist President, Mohammad Khatami, in 1997 prompted conservative 
forces to rally around the supreme leader in order thwart any attempt at changing the nature of the 
Islamic Republic. Ironically, Khamenei himself had started his career aligned with the political 
faction that would eventually become the heart of the reformist movement in Iran.57 
 The reformists were born out of the populist Khomeinist faction - named so because 
Ayatollah Khomeini explicitly threw his support behind them during the last two years of his life.58 
Khomeini supported them because the egalitarian economic policies and leftist militancy of this 
faction were more in line with his revised doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih, and the principle of ahkam-
e-sanaviyeh. After Khomeini’s death, the revolutionary fervor of the radical Khomenist faction 
died down and their ideology evolved from a militant form of Islamic populism to focus on 
personal freedoms.59 Many members of this radical faction such as Ebrahim Nabavi, Said Hajarian, 
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Mehdi Karrubi, and Mir Hossein Mousavi would later reemerge as part of the reformist 
movement.60 This change in philosophy can be also attributable to the fact that after Khomeini’s 
death, this faction fell out of favor because of their radical policies that were blamed for much of 
the economic stagnation in Iran after the war.61 With the passing of their main supporter, the 
Khomeinists were sidelined by an alliance of pragmatists and conservatives. The pragmatists, 
represented by Rafsanjani, had close ties to the mercantile class of the Bazaaris and were 
concerned with building a viable modern state without challenging the founding ideology of 
Khomeini.62 The conservatives believed in an absolutist-Islamic theocracy that had no room for 
the populist policies of the Khomeinists because it meant the Supreme Leader had to be responsive 
to the needs of the people.63 As you will note, all of these factions represented different aspects of 
Khomeini’s ideology and most of the cleavages revolved around the issues of economics and 
reconstruction. 
 The emergence of the reformist faction with the election of Khatami, heralded a new type 
of political cleavage that was not related to any of the salient issues of the preceding periods.64 The 
populism of the old Khomeinists had morphed to focus more on individual freedoms and 
democracy. Khatami’s election took the establishment by surprise, as he won with seventy percent 
of the vote in a record turnout. 65 As a relatively unknown candidate with liberal view on social 
issues during his time as culture minister in the early nineties, Khatami was supposed to be the 
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token candidate that mollified those who wanted some opening up of the political and social 
space.66 Khatami’s aim was to reconcile Islam with a version of democracy that would address the 
conflict between Iran’s elected and non-elected institutions, emphasizing “popular consent and 
sovereignty, political pluralism, competition and participation, civil society, human rights, the rule 
of law and constitutionalism, republicanism, a limited version of theocracy as a legally bound 
office elected by the people (not appointed by God)” among others.67  
In response to Khatami’s attempts at reform, the conservative factions rallied behind the 
Supreme Leader, and new fundamentalist factions emerged and were promoted by the Office of 
the Supreme Leader to counter the reformists.68 At the core of these new fundamentalist factions 
were the IRGC with their Basiji militia units under the direct control of Ayatollah Khamenei, and 
a cadre of hardline clerics such as Ayatollah Jannati and Muhammad Taghi Mesbah-Yazdi who 
served as sources of spiritual inspiration for them. 69 Mesbah-Yazdi in particular was quite vitriolic 
in his rhetoric calling for violence against anyone who would seek to reform Islam.70 As a result, 
while Khatami was able to provide some opening up of the cultural and political space in the 
country, most of his efforts at major reform were rolled back or stymied leading to disillusionment 
among his supporters.71 In the subsequent elections, through a combination of low voter turnout, 
and mass disqualification of reformist candidates, the conservatives and their fundamentalist allies 
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were able to completely dominate Iranian electoral politics especially after the 2005 election of 
the conservative mayor of Tehran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.72 
While this overreliance on the conservative and fundamentalists seems to have made 
Khamenei a more powerful political figure and had halted the reformists at first glance, a deeper 
examination arguably reveals that it may have weakened the position of the Supreme Leader. The 
constitutional amendments of 1989 were meant to turn Khomeini’s informal authority into a 
constitutional form that would make up for Khamenei’s weak credentials.73 Additionally, in order 
to extricate himself from the shadow of Rafsanjani, Khamenei had been meticulously replacing 
the President’s men in powerful positions with his loyalists since the mid-nineties.74 Along with 
his control over the IRGC and the Basij, who were the driving force behind the election of 
Ahmadinejad in 2005, Khamenei’s influence had never seemed more pronounced. In the elections 
for the Seventh Majlis (parliament), “more than one-third of the candidates […] were war 
veterans.”75 The Revolutionary Guard had also significantly expanded its footprint in the Iranian 
economy, obtaining no-bid contracts valued in the billions of Dollars for Southern-Pars Gas field, 
expanding the Tehran Metro, among others.76 However, having sidelined the reformists, Khamenei 
had become overly reliant on the conservatives and especially the fundamentalists, making it 
difficult for him to balance out their influence.77 The situation became even more problematic after 
Khamenei threw his support behind Ahmadinejad after the disputed 2009 elections, in a bid to 
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prevent the reformists regaining the office of the Presidency.78 That saw many Iranians pour into 
the street, alleging that the elections had been stolen from the candidates backed by the reformists, 
Messrs. Mir-Hussein Mousavi and Mehdi Karrubi.79 As the demonstrations went on, the 
crackdown intensified and chants of “Where’s my vote?” challenging the legitimacy of 
Ahmadinejad’s election changed to that of “Death to the Dictator” in direct reference to Khamenei 
himself.80 
The Green Movement, as the protests came to be known, was not able to achieve its aims 
of overturning the results of what was widely considered to be “the most blatant vote-rigging in 
the history of the Islamic Republic,”81 and was suppressed by the regime, seriously damaging the 
legitimacy of the regime. Ahmadinejad, who was unruly even before his reelection bid, having 
challenged the Supreme Leader on a number of occasions during his first term,82 became even 
more difficult to work with, butting heads with parliament83 and the Supreme Leader on numerous 
occasions.84 As a result there “was a further intensification of a secondary cleavage between the 
fundamentalist and the traditionalist-conservative parties.”85 This division prevented the 
                                                          
78 Nader Hashemi, “Rowhani’s Challenge” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs 10 (Summer 2013): 30 
79 Abbas Milani, “Iran’s Democratic Movements,” in Politics & Culture in Contemporary Iran, ed. Abbas Milani & 
Larry Diamond (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2015): 250 
80 Mehrangiz Kar, “Democracy After the Green Movement” in Politics & Culture in Contemporary Iran, ed. Abbas 
Milani & Larry Diamond (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2015): 70 
81 Ibid. 
82 Most notably, in a significant act of defiance, President Ahmadinejad exercised his constitutional prerogative to 
replace Ali Larijani, who had been appointed by the Supreme Leader as the head Supreme National Security 
Council, with one of his own confidants, Said Jalili. Khamenei was forced to settle for merely having Larijani as one 
of his 2 representatives on the SNSC. 
83 Thomas Erdbrink, “Top Iranian Politicans Exchange Accusations,” New York Times, February 4, 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/05/world/middleeast/high-level-feud-bares-tensions-in-iran.html  
84 Saeed Kamali Dehghan, “Iran's supreme leader tells Ahmadinejad: accept minister or quit”, The Guardian, May 6, 
2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/06/iran-supreme-leader-ahmadinejad-minister  
85 Hossein Bashiriyeh, “Cleavages in Iranian Politics Since 1979”, in Politics & Culture in Contemporary Iran, ed. 
Abbas Milani & Larry Diamond (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2015): 61 
24 
 
conservative factions to coalesce around a single candidate in the 2013 Presidential elections, 
paving the path for Hassan Rouhani’s surprise victory.  
Rouhani’s election was made possible by an unlikely alliance between Iran’s embattled 
reformists and the center-right faction to which Rouhani and Rafsanjani belong.86 This benefited 
both sides since it allowed the reformists to regain influence after being in the political wilderness 
during the conservative-dominated Ahmadinejad era, and it benefited Rouhani in that it allowed 
him to benefit from the popularity of the reformist movement to get-out-the vote.87 Given the 
economic and international problems caused by Ahmadinejad’s hardline government, Khamenei’s 
permissiveness during the election and the subsequent towards Rouhani could be interpreted in the 
light of the principle of Maslahat-e Nezam. The regime could hope to 1) quiet the remnants of the 
Green Movement and alleviate popular anger at the regime that had been building since 2009; 2) 
find solutions for the economic and foreign policy issues that were threatening the viability of the 
regime; 3) they could show that elections in Iran were indeed “free and fair” thus mending some 
of the damage caused by the fraud allegations of 2009.88  
However, it can be argued that the regime has miscalculated its ability to control the 
outcome of the events that have been set in motion since Rouhani’s election. Despite Khamenei’s 
deep ambivalence and hostility towards the U.S., he gave Rouhani enough political space to reach 
a nuclear deal with P5+1 Group and alleviate Iran’s economic and political isolation.89 Once the 
deal was reached, Khamenei forbade any further contact with the “arrogant powers” but the Iranian 
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foreign minister, Javad Zarif, has had numerous contacts with his U.S. counterpart, Secretary John 
Kerry, in regards to various regional matters.90 The judiciary, which is controlled by the Supreme 
Leader, imposed a press embargo on the former reformist President, Mohammad Khatami in the 
lead-up to the 2016 parliamentary elections.91 Rouhani has violated this embargo on numerous 
occasions, most notably during a televised speech in Khatami’s hometown of Yazd, causing a 
raucous response from the massive crowd that was muted by state television.92 In some ways, 
Khatami has proven to a more potent force for reform since he has left office. His endorsement of 
Rouhani in 2013 rallied reformist support behind him and energized the electorate. During 
February’s Parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections in Iran, the Rouhani’s pragmatist-
reformist coalition worked to defeat the hardliners, resulting in the reformist “List of Hope,” 
spearheaded by a former vice president of Khatami’s Mohammad Aref, winning all 30 of Tehran’s 
seats, and ousting all but one of the hardliners from the Assembly of Experts, thereby returning 
Rafsanjani to the Assembly after his ouster in 2011.93 This was despite the disqualification of 
almost all of the reformist candidates from the February elections which even included Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s reformist grandson, Hassan Khomeini.94 Most notably, Rouhani himself is a creature 
of the deep state and has connections across the ideological spectrum, having served in Iran’s 
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national security and foreign policy apparatus in several important positions, including as the head 
of the National Security Council from 1989-2005 (having been appointed by Khamenei) and chief 
nuclear negotiator from 2003-2005.95 This is in stark contrast to Khatami who had only briefly 
held the position of Minister of Culture before he became President. As such, Rouhani is better 
able to navigate the byzantine workings of the myriad of factions in Iranian politics and will not 
be as susceptible to the kind of pressure from hardliners that derailed much of the promise of 
Khatami’s presidency.  
Another major reason the hardliners might not be able to exert as much pressure is due to 
the regime’s fear that it can ill afford to have a repeat of major street protests of 2009’s Green 
Movement. General Mohammad Ali Jafaari, the senior commander of the Revolutionary Guard 
said that the events of the Green Movement posed a greater threat to regime stability than Saddam’s 
1980 invasion of Iran.96 The Basij (Sazman-e Basij-e Mostazafan, meaning the Organization for 
the Mobilization of the Oppressed) are civilian militias initially created by Ayatollah Khomeini 
through decree during the Iran-Iraq war, have become the main component of the regime’s 
coercive apparatus domestically. The Basij are under the control of the IRGC, and they were used 
extensively to control and eventually suppress Iran’s Green movement protests following the 
disputed 2009 election.97 However, the brutality of the effort it took to suppress the Green 
Movement has not only tarnished the image of the IRGC (which controls the Basij militias), it has 
also brought into question the reliability of the Basij in the event of another uprising.98 Only a 
fraction of the members of the Basij are true believers, while the rest join for the generous state 
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benefits or just for the thrill of violence.99 The fact that the Basij are not driven by a complete 
devotion to the theocratic ideology of the Islamic government is not a recent phenomenon, as a 
survey conducted in 1995 also “showed that only 35 percent of Basij members believe in the 
culture of the Basij and its values and live according to these beliefs.”100 Even the true believers 
don’t like to be involved in internal repression but will gladly defend the revolution from external 
threats, as evinced by the willingness of many who have travelled to Syria to achieve 
“martyrdom.”101 The last type of Basiji, the ones who are generally considered thugs (owbash) that 
just enjoy violence, have a long history going back centuries of being used by politicians and 
clergy to intimidate and marginalize their opponents.102 While they are very useful for 
intimidation, they cannot be counted on to remain loyal if a serious challenge to the regime where 
to threaten its viability.  
There is also an element of class-warfare to the way Basij members are recruited. An 
analysis of the Basiji’s economic backgrounds indicate that a majority of them are from lower-
income and working classes, with only 2.2 percent identifying as upper middle class.103 Candidates 
from poorer backgrounds tend to be more religious, which would make them better recruits for an 
Islamist militia organization since the Basij relies on volunteers to fill its ranks. Economic 
incentives, access to jobs and preferential admission to state universities, and not ideology are the 
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primary reasons people enlist with the Basij.104 Given the religious background of many of the 
members, the organization itself is ideologically more in line with the hardliners in Iran; but since 
the majority of its members have joined for opportunistic reasons, the regime is limited in using 
them to coercively respond to the reformists (especially after 2009) and has been using them 
mostly as rent-a-crowds to demonstrate the Islamic Republic’s popularity.105 
The Islamic Republic’s dual religious/democratic nature has been a source of constant 
friction since its founding. The leaders of the Islamic Republic, especially after the death of 
Khomeini, have touted voter turnout as a signifier of the regime’s legitimacy and the embrace of 
the Islamist ideology by the Iranian people.106 Ironically, higher voter turnout has historically 
translated to victory for those who emphasized a more democratic and pluralistic view, leading to 
the conclusion that most Iranians don’t participate in high numbers in elections because they 
believe in the regime. Rather, they see the ballot box as the only viable path to effect some sort of 
change in the regime, especially after Khatami’s election which gave rise to the reform movement 
within Iran. The reformists have also learned from the negative impact of boycotting elections 
following their disillusionment with Khatami’s failed efforts to bring about change.  
Iran’s hybrid system is neither completely democratic, nor is it completely despotic. It can 
be best described as a system of “Electoral Authoritarianism” where the regime holds regular 
elections but has violated “the liberal-democratic principles of freedom and fairness so profoundly 
and systematically as to render elections instruments of authoritarian rule rather than instruments 
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of democracy.”107 The Iranian electorate is perfectly aware that the elections are not “fair and free” 
as the regime often claims, yet they have come to expect a fair chance to have their voices heard 
within the limited ideological context that the Islamic Republic’s constitution allows. The main 
impetus for the protests following the disputed 2009 elections was that the regime had violated 
this unspoken arrangement by blatantly rigging the vote.108 While the protest might have been 
suppressed, it exposed deep cleavages within Iran’s political elite, which has allowed the 
reformists to participate by proxy (as they did with Rouhani, and the recent parliamentary 
elections), even when most of their own candidates are disqualified by the Guardian Council. The 
list of Hope included many candidates with dubious backgrounds, who might have even been 
opponents of the reformists in the past, or as Sadegh Zibakalam, a prominent reformist analyst 
from the University of Tehran puts it, “we had to choose between bad and worse.”109 It remains to 
be seen how effective of a voting block they will be in the next Majlis. A principled stand would 
have meant that reformists would have been completely blocked out of Iranian politics at a critical 
period where there is the potential for selecting Khamenei’s successor. A survey of a 125 
legislative election in sub-Saharan Africa held between 1983 & 2009, dispels the notion that 
opposition boycott and protests can delegitimize electorally authoritarian regimes and bring about 
democratic change; rather it is “opposition participation and acceptance of the outcome” that are 
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“associated with the transformation of electoral autocracies into democracies over a sequence of 
multiparty elections.” 110 A figure that stands out when examining the voting patterns in Iran is 
that about fifteen percent of the population has consistently voted for conservative and hardline 
candidates during presidential elections.111 This means that boycotting the elections by reformists 
during the 2005 cycle only amplified the effect of the conservative votes, even though their total 
number of votes had remained unchanged. Boycotting elections therefore, is a losing strategy by 
those wishing to bring about democratic change to the Iranian system as the regime can rely on 
these voters to maintain a veneer of legitimacy. 
The democratic elements of the constitution of the Islamic Republic are short circuited by 
the unelected religious components of the hybrid system based on the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih. 
Yet as I have attempted to show, there are ideological as well as practical approaches to reforming 
these institutions to become more democratic and pluralistic. The hardline elements within the 
Iranian regime, led by Ayatollah Khamenei, still control the state’s coercive apparatus and have 
access to extensive financial resources with the IRGC’s business interests and the opaque religious 
foundations known as Bonyads. Therefore, even though the reform movement does have a high 
degree of buy in from certain members of the political elite, this is not enough to overcome the 
power imbalance in the political structure of the Islamic Republic, which highlights the need for a 
strong civil society (Jame-e-ye Madani) in Iran to pursue Hajarian’s “pressure from the bottom, 
negotiation from the top!” strategy.   
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Civil Society in Iran 
 As it was established in the previous section, there is indeed at least a small but growing 
group of political elites within the Islamic Republic who seem committed to establishing a more 
pluralistic form of government.112 However, this group has very little control over the coercive 
apparatus of the regime, the reins of which are under the control of the Supreme Leader and his 
hardline allies. Therefore, the role of the Iranian people and civil society in pushing for democratic 
change from below cannot be overemphasized.  
Civil society as a concept is rather amorphous and difficult to define. According to Larry 
Diamond, civil society is “the realm of organized social life that is open, voluntary, and bound by 
a legal order or set of shared rules.”113 Through civil society, private citizens can as individuals or 
collective grouping, express their interests, make demands of the state to check its power, and as 
such can include a whole host of non-governmental groups that have varying degrees of 
organization. 114 This is why civil society is so closely associated with the establishment and 
consolidation of democracy.115 Yet, civil society as it is understood in modern political science, as 
the intermediary between the private sphere and the state, is absent in Iran. This begs the question, 
that why in the long history of democratic struggle in Iran, has civil society not managed to take 
hold? 
During Iran’s Constitutional Revolution of 1907, the leaders of the revolution were more 
concerned with curbing the excesses of the Qajar dynasty than with creating a strong civil society 
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culture.116 While the quest for establishing the sovereignty of the people was undoubtedly a 
democratic endeavor, the movement did not have deep roots outside of a small group of 
enlightened aristocracy. Consequently, a host of obstacles militated against the creation of a 
democratic state in Iran at the time, including but not limited to: Iran’s overall backwardness at 
the time; the diverging interests of powerful Shia clerics whose aim was not democracy but to 
restore their privileges that had been diminished; a largely illiterate and nomadic population; and 
finally, the imperial rivalry between Russia and Great Britain as part of the Great Game that 
hobbled efforts at reform.117 The Constitutional Revolution was a grassroots attempt at self-
governance that fell victim to the turmoil in its aftermath.118 In the face of such chaos the natural 
tendency to gravitate towards a strong state119 that could provide some measure of stability in 
exchange for the surrender of civil liberties was all too tempting. This can be referred to as 
“repressive development”: social and economic development without political modernization.120  
The authoritarian state-monopolized type of modernization, followed by Reza Shah 
Pahalavi and his son Mohammad Reza, alienated many sectors of Iranian society and limited the 
interactive development of civil society,121 a paternalistic pattern held throughout the Pahlavi Era 
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(1925-1979). The premiership of Mohammad Mosaddeq (1951-1953) is often heralded as a 
democratic period that was thwarted by CIA-backed coup, saw the prime minister taking on 
emergency powers to combat both perceived and real threats against the drive to nationalize Iran’s 
oil industry.122 The movement that brought Mossadeq to power had three components: the National 
Front that had a nationalist-democratic bent, the Tudeh (the Communist party of Iran), and the 
Islamists of Fedayan-e Eslam. These three groups were only loosely aligned and there was nothing 
to turn them into a coherent political force since outside of the National Front, both the Tudeh and 
the Fedayan-e Eslam rejected democratic pluralism and were in fact anti-democratic in nature.123 
While the coup saw the Shah returned to power with expanded autocratic powers, it did provide a 
valuable lesson: “that without constitutionalism, and by implication without the expansion of civil 
society and the mutual interactive development of social interests, national self-assertion will not 
lead to the liberation of the people from foreign powers and indigenous dictatorship.”124 It is a 
lesson that was forgotten by the time of the 1979 Revolution when Khomeini took power trying to 
recreate an Islamist version of the strong state.125 Instead of a strong state, however, factional 
rivalries and the domination of economic activity by the regime elite has contributed to the creation 
of a rentier state version of “plunder capitalism”126 that has stunted the development of 
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independent economic interests which is the prerequisite for the development of a robust civil 
society.  
In fact, the very idea of civil society is a fairly recent phenomenon in Iranian political 
discourse as it did not achieve any real prominence until the election of the reformist Mohammad 
Khatami in 1997.127 Since then, jame-ye madani, has become central to the discussions relating to 
the advancement of a pluralistic democratic society in Iran.128 It is because of this association with 
the reform movement that the hardliners have either cracked down on civil society institutions 
such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), a situation that has worsened since the 
aftermath of the Green Movement. The hardliners see any organization that can give the people 
the ability to take control of the various aspects of their lives, no matter how benign the cause, as 
a direct threat to the authority of the regime.129 NGOs are technically legal under the laws of the 
Islamic Republic. Under Article 8 of the Parties, Societies, and Associations Act of 1981, the 
Interior Ministry is in charge of issuing licenses.130 In practice, an NGO is unlikely to get 
“approved unless it has explicit or implicit links with the authorities”131 making the supposed non-
governmental nature of the organization moot. Article 26 of the Constitution132 stipulates a vague 
“Islamic Standards” for any organization or party that wants to register, creating an ideological 
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criteria that makes the establishment and nurturing of a vibrant civil society nearly impossible. 
Consequently, while Iran has many NGOs, they “lack independence and financial resources” 
which, coupled with the fact that many are unable to take advantage of the expertise of foreign 
entities for the fear of government reprisals, serve to restrict their efficacy.133 Moreover, as we 
have seen with the Basij, the regime sees the poor (mostazafan) as its core constituency and co-
opts the role civil society would play in providing aid to them. Given these restrictions, and the 
lack of a historic background of a civil society in Iran, we must then attempt to conceptualize a 
different arrangement that would fulfill the functions of a civil society in aiding democratic 
development.  
Figure 2. Institutional Features of Civil Society 134 
A sphere of society separate from the state and economy (but with some mutual interpretations with these 
spheres) 
Multiplicity of autonomous voluntary associations (e.g., NGOs, community groups, faith based 
organizations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movement groups, 
advocacy groups) 
Freedom of Communication (Freedom of media and gathering) 
Individual and collective rights that are guaranteed and regulated by laws 
Tolerance and nonviolence in conflict resolution 
 
Figure 3. Human Foundations of Civil Society 135 
Personal Space (Privacy): a domain of free individual moral choice and self-development 
Solidarity: a sphere in which a certain kind of universalizing community comes to be culturally 
defined 
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Farzin Vahdat argues that for the institutional features of a civil Society (Figure 2) to take 
hold, the human foundations of a civil society (Figure 3) must come first.136 The first element of 
the human foundations of a civil society create an agency (or subjectivity) within the individual. 
The second element creates inter-subjectivity which allows individuals to share their agency in 
pursuit of a common goal. In fact, the Revolution of 1979 had both of these elements in place with 
Khomeini and other ideological architects of the revolution, such as Ali Shariati and Morteza 
Motahhari, encouraging the masses to become empowered (with a sense of agency) and to 
participate in revolutionary activities.137 Khomeini’s charismatic authority and the regime’s 
suppression of competing centers of power where people can freely associate with each other, have 
prevented the formation of a civil society strong enough to work for the purposes of democratic 
consolidation.  
In the absence of such a civil society, social movements can provide the same functions in 
expanding the demands and interests of the people of Iran.138 As Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato 
point out in Civil Society and Political Theory, “social movements constitute the dynamic element 
in processes that might realize the positive potentials of modern civil societies,” adding that this 
“reconstructed theory of civil society in indispensable to an adequate understanding of the logic, 
stakes, and potentials of contemporary social movements.”139 The Green Movement is perhaps the 
social movement that can fill this role. The movement has created a sense of agency in the 
generation born after the revolution, and even though the demonstrations of 2009 were brutally 
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suppressed, it did allow for a sense of inter-subjectivity to develop between the participants. 
Moreover, while the movement enjoys the support of some of the regime elites, it is essentially a 
leaderless grass-roots phenomenon that is very much like the Constitutional Revolution in spirit, 
but with a much broader base of support. Its pursuit of gradual reform allows it to avoid the chaos 
of that failed attempt, while its leaderless nature prevents the kind of personal domination that led 
to the authoritarian nature of the ensuing Islamic Republic. 
The Green Movement  
 Ramin Jahanbegloo, an Iranian philosopher and academic who was imprisoned by the 
Iranian regime in 2006 for a 125 days, described the Green Movement as “a major nonviolent 
movement in a Gandhian style.”140 The Green Movement got its name from the color of banners 
and bandanas used by the supporters of Mir Hussein Mousavi. After the events of 2009, however, 
it has generally come to represent the reform movement as a whole. The protests that occurred on 
the streets of Iran in the aftermath of the disputed 2009 presidential election were the culmination 
of decades of frustration with the Islamic Republic’s failed economic promises and repressive 
policies. The movement was praised by Abbas Milani, another Iran scholar, “as a new, nonviolent, 
nonutopian, and popular paradigm of change.”141 A movement of such size did not develop in a 
vacuum, and even though the street protests were brutally quashed it has perhaps irreversibly 
damaged the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic and reinvigorated the reform movement at a 
crucial juncture in the regime’s history. In this section I will illustrate why despite its seeming 
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failure to dislodge the regime, the legacy of the Green Movement has the potential to outdo Iran’s 
failed past attempts at democratization.  
 The Green Movement can be broken down into three distinct periods: The weeks preceding 
the 2009 Presidential elections, that saw enthusiasm grow around the election process among all 
the supporters of the candidates, but mainly on the reformist side represented by Mir Hussein 
Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi; the period after the results were announced that saw massive street 
demonstrations that lasted for an entire week; the ensuing crackdown by the regime (by some 
estimates more than seventy demonstrators killed and many thousands arrested and tortured).142 It 
was the crackdown during this period that seems to have done the most lasting damage to regime 
legitimacy.  
 In the first period two major characteristics of the election set it apart from what had 
preceded it. For the first time ever, the candidates held debates where they able to challenge each 
other, creating an atmosphere that engendered free speech in stark contrast to the previously tightly 
state controlled events of the past.143 This broke the repressive atmosphere that had predominated 
the Ahmadinejad era where most of the reformist press had been shut down and it attracted the 
attention of the electorate. Before this, there was a general atmosphere of apathy following the 
failed reformist presidency of Khatami that led to the run-off victory of Ahmadinejad in 2005. 
Voter indifference was such during that election that even though there was strong evidence of 
fraud, the result did not cause any public indignation. 144 Electrified by the seeming openness of 
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the contest, the electorate started participating in huge gatherings for both the reformist and 
conservative candidates, in an almost “carnivalesque” atmosphere where the sexes comingled 
without any harassment from the morality patrols (Gasht-e Ershad), that would have been 
unthinkable only a few weeks before.145  
 Much like the election of Mohammad Khatami in 1997, the regime seems to have 
underestimated the level of excitement that the elections would generate. Mir Hussein Mousavi 
had been out of government since the post of Prime Minister (1980-1988) had been eliminated 
after Khomeini’s death. He had previously declined to run in the 1997 and the 2005 elections, even 
though he supported Khatami.146 As was discussed in an earlier section, Mousavi used to belong 
to the radical faction that was favored by the late Khomeini, and one point he had sided with the 
prime minister in a dispute with the then president, Ali Khamenei. Despite his history of executive 
conflict with Khamenei, and his associations with the reform movement and his prominent profile 
in the formative years of the Islamic Republic, the Guardian Council approved his candidacy. In 
the calculations of the conservative forces, Mousavi’s lack of natural charisma combined with his 
long absence from politics, would limit his chances of getting elected.147 The same coalition of 
Iran’s nascent civil society, women’s movement, student groups, and economically disaffected 
population that had elected Khatami, rallied behind Mousavi’s campaign.148 Despite his disastrous 
first term, marked by a reckless style of populism that had led to international isolation and 
economic pain, Ahmadinejad had the support of Ayatollah Khamenei and his conservative 
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faction.149 The festive and open mood that characterized the election campaign season, raised 
hopes that the regime will allow for a “fair” vote much like when Khatami was elected.150 If the 
regime had not allowed such an open atmosphere in the lead up to the election, which raised 
people’s expectations about the fairness of the vote this time around, the outrage against electoral 
fraud would have been as muted as the 2005 elections. 
 The announcement of Ahmadinejad’s overwhelming victory even before the polls had 
closed, marked the beginning of the second period of the Green Movement, and for week that 
followed huge, but initially peaceful demonstrations took over the streets of Tehran and other 
major cities. Much ink has been spilled about whether Ahmadinejad’s re-election was fraudulent 
or not, and the evidence for both sides is circumstantial even if it tilts in favor of the fraud side. 
The perception of fraud is all that matters in this context. By some estimates as many as 3 million 
people participated at the height of the protests, demanding simply “Where’s my Vote?,” and 
capturing the essence of the fundamentally democratic ideals of the Green Movement.151 
 When the protests didn’t stop after a week of the security forces attempting to discourage 
it through intimidation, beatings, and cutting off mobile and internet connections, the Supreme 
Leader unambiguously threw his support behind Ahmadinejad during his June 18th, 2009, Friday 
sermon, thereby unleashing the IRGC and Basij units on the demonstrators in what marks the third 
period of the Green Movement. 152 When Karroubi, Mousavi, his Zahra Rahnavard (Mousavi’s 
wife who had actively campaigned with her husband in what was a first for the Islamic Republic) 
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refused to accept what they believed to be the fraudulent results of the election, they were put 
under house arrest on direct orders of Khamenei.153  
As the crackdown intensified, the chants of “Where’s my Vote?” turned into “Death to 
Dictator” in direct reference to the Supreme Leader.154 While there had been numerous protests 
against the regime, it was hitherto unimaginable to hear slogans directly challenging the central 
pillar of the Islamic Republic system, the doctrine of the Velyat-e Faqih. By so brazenly supporting 
Ahmadinejad, Khamenei had compromised the façade of the “neutral arbiter” the Supreme Leader 
was supposed to maintain, leading to a loss of legitimacy.155 The arrests of its leaders and brutal 
tactics of the regime, meant that the protests could not go on indefinitely, especially since the 
participation of the lower classes of society had been episodic at best due to a lack of organization 
and limited consideration of their mainly economic demands within the Green Movement.156 
Consequently, the regime was finally able to bring about the end of public protests. 
The end of the Green Movement’s street protests does not mean that it is a spent political 
force. The brutal tactics the regime had to resort to in order to quash the protests has done some 
serious (perhaps irreparable) harm to its connection with the people. The regime tried to paint the 
protests as another “color revolution” fomented by Western governments,157 but the widespread 
nature and the intensity of the protests makes that a hollow argument. More importantly, the Green 
Movement and the enthusiasm it generated, renewed the sense of agency in the Iranian electorate, 
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especially among the reformist coalition that had become so disheartened after the Khatami 
administration. Moreover, the protests allowed for a sense of inter-subjectivity to be established 
among the participants. It was this same group that proved so crucial in the decisive first round 
election of Hassan Rouhani in 2013, and the parliamentary and Expediency council elections in 
February 2016, illustrating that the Green Movement still maintains a significant degree of political 
influence. In the following section we look at how the demographic make-up of this group, and 
their beliefs provide the best chance for democratic reform within the next decade or so. 
Iran’s Youth – What Makes them a Force for Democratic Change? 
 The vast majority of those who took part in the Green Movement protests were young, 
more specifically they are the generation that was born after the Islamic Revolution.158 A 
staggering 63 percent of Iran’s population is under the age of 35,159 making this group the largest 
voting bloc in Iran’s electorate. This population pattern is not unique to Iran, as many countries in 
the region also have populations in which the youth comprise the largest segment. In fact this 
“Youth Bulge” was arguably one of the contributing factors to the upheavals in the MENA region 
that came to be known as the Arab Spring, as numerous studies have shown that countries with 
such a skewed population structure are at high risk of experiencing political violence and civil 
strife.160 The Youth Bulge theory is only marginally applicable to the Iranian case since it mostly 
predicts the occurrence of violence as a result of the presence of a large male cohort,161 and such 
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a gender imbalance is not evident in the Iran according to the available census data.162 Iran’s young 
population, however, has certain other characteristics that set it further apart from the other 
countries in the region, namely their educational attainment, as well as their more liberal attitudes 
towards gender roles and religion. It is the combination of these factors that has made them such 
a potent challenge to the authoritarian nature of the Islamic Republic.  
 Given the overwhelmingly young, and highly educated group that has formed the backbone 
of the reform movement since the presidential elections of 1997, one of the Islamic Republic’s 
proudest accomplishments (universal education) might be the very thing that in the end will lead 
to its demise as an ideologically Islamist state. Lipset’s 1959 modernization hypothesis sees the 
development of a country, particularly in regards to its educational attainment, as the main factor 
in creating and sustaining democratic politics and institutions.163 On the individual level, higher 
levels of education lead to a stronger sense of civic duty and interest in politics, which in turn leads 
more political participation.164 One of the main social changes in Iran after the Revolution has 
been a concentrated effort by the government to expand mass formal education.165 As figures 4 
and 5 illustrate, there has been a dramatic improvement of educational attainment among the 
relatively large generation that was born after the 1979 Revolution. The gender gap in education 
has all but disappeared for the younger age groups, and this reflected in enrollment rates public 
universities (that are much more difficult to enter), where women are entering at much greater 
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numbers than men166, comprising 65 percent of those admitted in 2007.167 The Islamization of 
education, as part of a nationwide literacy jihad, which segregated schools based on gender, turned 
education into a religious duty and made attending school more acceptable for daughters of 
religiously conservative families even when their parents might have otherwise objected.168  
Figure 4 - Reconstructed 1970 distribution of the 
population of Iran by age, sex, and educational 
attainment 169 
 
 
Figure 5 - Population of Iran ages 15 and older by 
age, sex, and educational attainment, 2000170 
 
 
 
This narrowing of the education gap between men and women has social implications that 
effect democratic development. Even though women’s labor force participation rates in Iran 
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remain low compared to their level of education, they are no longer settling for low-paying manual 
jobs in the carpet and textile industries.171 Instead they have increasingly moved into the higher 
paying service sector jobs, reaching almost 50 percent of the total jobs in that sector by 2006.172 
Despite some obvious and some not so obvious glass ceilings, Iranian women have managed to 
rise in executive and managerial ranks as well, albeit in much smaller numbers that reflect the 
numerous legal and cultural impediments that are still present.173 Combined, these factors have 
significantly improved the status of women, their confidence, and their increased expectations 
about having more options in determining their own futures, at least in their private life.174 
This sense of self-determination is reflected in the record-setting fertility rate declines, the 
rise of divorce rates, and the increasing prominence of “White Marriages” (co-habitation of 
couples without marriage, in defiance of the country’s strict Islamic laws). Fertility rates among 
Iranian women has declined from a high of 7.0 in the mid-1980’s to 1.9 in 2006, and this pattern 
is the same for women in rural and urban areas.175 The increased sense of independence among 
women has also changed the nature of marriage in Iran. Even though the family unit remains an 
important component of Iranian society, it is has moved away from a mere financial arrangement 
between the family of the bride and the groom, towards a more secular, individualistic version that 
is akin to marriages here in the West, along with the corresponding increase in divorce rates.176 
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Although there have yet to be any studies conducted about the recent trend of the rise of White 
Marriages, anecdotal evidence points to the same move away from a financial arrangement to the 
personal choice of cohabitating partners.177 It is the incongruity of this elevated sense of 
independence and agency among Iranian women, and the patriarchal laws and attitudes of the 
Islamic Republic that has made women of the main driving forces for democratic change in Iran. 
Not only were women instrumental in the election of Mohammad Khatami in 1997, there has 
remained a vibrant women’s rights movement even during the most repressive days of the 
Ahmadinejad administration178, and as we will examine in the next section, the non-violent 
template of the movement is what has been adopted by the Green Movement as well. Women’s 
widespread involvement in the 2009 protests was far deeper than merely being present, as very 
often they would use their bodies to shield others from the security service beatings, producing the 
double effect of tempering the violence, as well as inspiring their male counterparts to stand their 
ground, making gender, one of the main points of contrast between the Green Movement and the 
Islamic regime.179  
Another notable aspect of Iran’s youth is their attitude towards religion in general, and 
towards the role of religion in government in particular. Despite the 1979 Revolution’s 
establishment of an authoritarian Islamist government, it has failed to create a religious order in 
society during its thirty seven years in power. Iranians today seem to be far less religious than the 
populations of other Islamic countries.180 A survey of public values in Iran in 2005 pointed towards 
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a dramatic shift towards liberal democracy and secularism, especially when it came to placing a 
higher value on such things as social individualism and gender equality.181 This shift towards 
individual rights and democracy happened in the absence of a robust private economic sector (the 
regime through state and semi-state owned entities controls the as much as 70 percent of the Iranian 
economy)182, suggesting that the change is attitudes in Iranian society is an oppositional reaction 
to the stifling authoritarianism of the religious ideology of the Islamic Republic.183 The 
aforementioned survey by Iranian researchers was further validated by another study conducted 
out of Israel that found that the Iranian public is more embracing of liberal democratic values than 
more established democracies (according to Freedom House rankings) such as Turkey or India.184  
This new brand of secularism is different from what was present in Iran in previous 
generations, which had an antagonistic approach to religion. The old approach embraced by late 
nineteenth and twentieth century secular intellectuals in Iran and influenced by the French 
Revolution’s Laïcité and Marxism, advocated for the elimination of religion from the public 
sphere.185 It was partially the rejection of that kind of secularism that led to Khomeini to argue that 
it was incompatible with Iran’s Islamic culture, mockingly stating that the goal of the Western 
Imperialists was to limit the role of Islam to instructions about “menstruation and parturition.”186 
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The Green Movement does not reject religion itself, but it wants to remove religion’s role in 
government, as evinced by the fact that the protesters either appropriated the slogans and tactics 
of the 1979 Revolution verbatim by shouting “Allahu Akbar” from rooftops at night, or they 
modified them to reflect their demand for a separation of Mosque and State, shouting “Estaghlal, 
Azadi, Jomhury-e Irani” (Independence, Freedom, Iranian Republic) instead of the original slogan 
that ended with a demand for an Islamic Republic (Jomhury-e Eslami).187 In essence it is a type of 
nationalism that is not characterized by xenophobia, rather it seeks to emphasize the primacy of 
Iranian-ness (no matter what ethnic group or religious sect one might belong to) over the Muslim 
identity, which is at the heart of the justification of the rule of the Velayat-e Faqih. It would be 
simplistic to say that all those who participated in (or silently supported) the 2009 protests were 
looking to drastically change the nature of the regime. Yet, their economic demands and slogans 
that focused on government accountability, respect for human rights, and freedom of expression 
were all predicated on the liberalization of the Iranian political system. 188 
According to a study published by the Wilson International Center for Scholars, Iran’s 
demographic trends make it a prime candidate to transition to a liberal democracy by the year 
2030.189 While the robustness of Iran’s regime might prove to be a significant obstacle, as it was 
discussed in this section, the attitudes of the youth population in Iran in favor of such a change 
would indicate that the necessary conditions might be present for a successful transition. Before 
we can proceed to a summation of the elements covered thus far, it is imperative to examine the 
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crucial role Iranian women and Iran’s women’s movements have had in shaping the contours of 
the struggle for democracy, especially since the advent of the reform era in Iran.  
Women & the Green Movement 
 For anyone watching footage of various protests during June of 2009, the strong presence 
of women in the Green Movement is inescapable. While the protests may have started as a response 
to a perceived stolen election, there was a broader context preceding the election that made gender 
politics play a defining role in the subsequent creation of the Green Movement. As was discussed 
in the previous section, the majority of Iran’s women are young, more educated than their male 
counterparts, and have consequently developed a sense of agency that sees the restrictions put 
upon women by the ideologically Islamist laws of the constitution as unfair and they seek to change 
it. As of 2012, there were more than forty groups focused on women’s issues and more than seven 
hundred women civil and human rights activists in Iran, making up the women’s movement that 
has come into existence since the first years of the 1979 Revolution.190 Of course that is not to say 
that the women’s movement in Iran only emerged after the Islamic Revolution. On the contrary, 
Iranian women have been a constant force that has been involved in the various democratization 
attempts in Iran going back to the Constitutional Revolution. However, in each instance women’s 
rights and freedoms were sidelined by other concerns. In the case of the Constitutional Revolution, 
active opposition from the Shi’a clergy and the ensuing chaos meant that women, who had a small 
but significant role in the success of the movement, did not see any dividends for their efforts.191 
In the intervening years, urban women were subjected to forced unveiling, something that was 
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welcomed by the higher social classes but had an isolating effect on women from more traditional 
families.192 During Mohammed Reza Shah’s 1963 series of reforms dubbed the White Revolution, 
universal suffrage was extended to all of Iranians, giving women the right to vote for the first 
time.193 Interestingly enough, it was opposition to these reforms that marked Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
first foray into the national political spotlight, as his fiery speeches railing against the details of 
the White Revolution, including the right of women to vote led to his arrest and exile. During the 
latter years of he Shah’s reign, women’s issues were coopted by the state for propaganda purposes 
and lost their legitimacy.194 Iranian women of all backgrounds participated massively in the 
Islamic Revolution and many adopted the veil as a temporary way to protest the Shah’s 
Westoxification.195 The Revolution undid many of the legal reforms that had benefited women 
during the Shah’s time, the most visible manifestation of which was the imposition of the Islamic 
hijab, something that was protested against vociferously but to no avail.196 Contrary to the 
supporting role women played in the Islamic Revolution, which muted their concerns due to the 
association of women’s rights with the unpopular Shah, the women of the Green Movement, 
equipped with a feminist consciousness due to decades of struggle against the Islamic mores of 
the regime, are protesting alongside their male counterparts to gain access to equal rights in all 
spheres of social, cultural and political life. In the process of doing so, not only have they made 
their demands about the equality of genders a central platform of the reform movement, they have 
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also influenced the non-violent manner in which the Green Movement has chosen to pursue its 
struggle.  
 Iran’s women’s movement of the past three decades has been a genuinely grassroots 
movement that is not divided along ideological lines of secularism versus religion and as such has 
“freely borrowed from the heterogeneous fabric of Iran’s rich Islamic, pre-Islamic, national and 
secular heritage and discourses.”197 Women have been engaged in a constant push back, using 
creative tactics, against the Islamist ideologues of the regime, who were trying to minimize the 
social, cultural, and economic space available to women. The constant struggle between the 
morality police and the women with what is deemed to be insufficiently pious hijab, the excessive 
use of cosmetics, the shrinking size of overcoats and scarves, might seem trivial at first glance, but 
it serves to subvert the state’s attempt to control women’s bodies.198 Various notable women’s 
rights campaigns in Iran including One Million Signatures and Stop Stoning Forever draw support 
from a plethora of different social strata.199 This latter approach can be described as more goal 
oriented, in contrast to the general spirit of defiance that characterizes the run ins with the morality 
police. These goal oriented movements saw the changing of specific discriminatory laws will 
gradually lead to a society in which men and women are treated equally.200 They had decided that 
the movement would encounter the least amount of resistance from the hardliners, if it remained 
apolitical. While this did give the women’s movement some room to maneuver in the repressive 
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days of the Ahmadinejad administration, both campaigns were under constant pressure and 
harassment by the hardliners and neither one was able to achieve its stated goals.201  
 In order to remedy this lack of success, a few months before the presidential elections of 
2009, for the first time in Iranian history, “women formed a broad coalition which brought together 
civil rights advocates, NGOs, political activists, and women who were active in presidential 
campaigns, media, and trade unions under one banner.”202 The coalition’s approached mirrored 
the goal-oriented manner of the previous campaigns (which despite their apparent failure, had 
managed to garner much international attention) by demanding that Iran become a party to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and 
calling for the elimination of all the laws that discriminated against women in the Iranian 
constitution.203 The relatively open atmosphere of the presidential elections forced all four 
candidates to take positions on the matter (the respective reformist campaigns of Mousavi and 
Karrubi supported the measures while the conservative candidates, Ahmadinejad and Rezaei’s 
opposed it). The organizational power of this coalition was instrumental in generating enthusiastic 
support for the reformist candidates, especially since Mousavi’s wife, Zahra Rahnavard, herself a 
successful academic, became a source of inspiration for women through her active participation in 
her husband’s campaign.  
 The spontaneous and bewildered nature of the protests that ensued after the election results 
were announced left the coalition leadership paralyzed as everyone took part in the demonstrations 
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as individuals and not a cohesive movement.204 However, the sense of agency that had been built 
up because of the unified voice in the pre-election period, made women integral parts of the Green 
Movement. The failure of the protests to force a proper accounting of the election results and the 
viciousness displayed by the regime in crushing the protests, meant that the women’s movement 
could no longer return to being apolitical. The tactic of focusing on changing specific laws that 
was pursued by women’s groups prior to 2009, acknowledged that government institutions had 
some legitimacy. Given that most government institutions fell in line behind the Supreme Leader, 
the lack of legitimacy now extended beyond the mere fraudulent re-election of Ahmadinejad to 
implicate every organ of the state. Following the election, the struggle became about something 
more fundamental, such as the right to have your vote counted, to assemble peacefully, and to 
participate in politics without being subjected to the horrific rape and torment the Green Movement 
protesters had to endure.205  
 While it might appear that women’s issues are once again taking a backseat to broader 
concerns in the context of a democratic struggle, this dichotomy is a fallacy. There is no reason 
Iran’s women’s movement should have to choose between pushing for equal rights for women, 
and being part of the Green Movement, especially in a country where the constitution is based on 
religious law that explicitly discriminates against women.206 This either/or view also fails to 
appreciate that the Green Movement is only the most prominent section of a much broader 
movement towards democracy in Iran.207  
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Women were once again instrumental in getting Rouhani elected in 2013 and he has 
appointed four women as vice-presidents and three women as governors. However, he has not 
achieved anything concrete in terms of women’s rights since the majority of his focus was on 
completing the nuclear deal.208 With the recent electoral victories for Rouhani’s coalition in the 
parliament and the Council of Experts, his supporters are looking for more tangible results. Iran’s 
women’s movement can and should continue to play a decisive role in this path towards democracy 
and self-determination by changing Iran’s social and political landscape through non-violent 
struggle.  
Conclusion  
In this paper I have shown that while the Constitution of the Islamic Republic has 
mechanisms that might allow it to be reformed along more democratic and pluralistic lines, the 
second version of the Khomeini Doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih gives the Supreme Leader and the 
unelected religious institutions of the government too much power. However, the very fact that the 
Supreme Leader can decide to override Sharia law if it were in the interests of the regime 
(Maslahat-e Nezam) means that were a more accommodating leader to succeed the aging 
Ayatollah Khamenei, the obstacles to such reforms would be much easier to overcome. This is 
partially why the supporters of the reform movement have decided to remain relevant through 
voting strategically for more moderate and conservative allies in order to remain politically 
relevant at this critical juncture. The List of Hope in Iran’s February 2016 elections for the 
members of parliament and the Assembly of Experts (which is charged with selecting the next 
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Supreme Leader) was a rare opportunity for Iranians to have an impact on the question of who will 
succeed Khamenei. 
The success in getting the List of Hope candidates elected to the parliament and more 
importantly to the Assembly of Experts is only a first step in that strategy and it remains to be seen 
if it is going to be successful. The approach being advocated by reformist leaders such as 
Mohammad Khatami relies on exploiting cleavages that have developed between the moderates 
and the traditional conservatives on the one side and the hardline camp on the other as a result of 
Ahmadinejad’s divisive policies. Ayatollah Khamenei is more ideologically aligned with the latter, 
but even he came to the realization that Ahmadinejad’s overly antagonistic policies had put the 
survival of the regime at risk and is attempting to rebalance. Despite this supposed softening on 
the part of the Supreme Leader, he remains hostile to any further rapprochement with what he calls 
“the arrogant powers” of the West.  
The main driver behind Rouhani’s election was the Green Movement that came about as a 
result of the protests over Ahmadinejad’s re-election. Rouhani seems to be in a very unique 
position due to several factor: he has ties to both the reformist/moderate camp and Ayatollah 
Khamenei; He has a good working relationship with Ali Larijani, the conservative speaker of the 
parliament that shepherded the nuclear deal through a contentious process; and finally, he seems 
to move at a deliberate pace in order to avoid a backlash from the more hardline elements of the 
regime. He made quite a number of promises to open up society and more importantly secure the 
freedom of the leaders of the Green Movement, Mir-Hussein Mousavi and Mehdi Karrubi who 
have been under house arrest along with their spouses since 2009. The fact remains that he has yet 
to deliver on many of these promises. His supporters have been patient since most of his first three 
years in office has been focused on securing a nuclear deal that would lift the crushing sanctions 
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on the Iranian economy. The decisive victories secured by Rouhani and his allies in the February 
2016 parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections show that he seems to have a clear mandate 
from the voters to push for more freedoms, yet it remains to be seen how aggressive he is willing 
to be.  
The Green Movement itself is rather amorphous and comprises a variety of groups that 
have different interests and yet see democratic reform as the best way to bring them to fruition. 
Not only have the leaders of the Green Movement been silenced for the most part during their 
house arrest, they are much more loyal to the regime itself and this constrains the ability of the 
movement to push for more drastic change. The Green Movement also needs to broaden its base 
of support by incorporating the economic concerns of the lower classes and minority rights. What 
became evident after the protests of 2009, is that the regime can survive a mass uprising as long 
as it can count on the support of its more hardline elements in the Basij and IRGC. The lengths the 
regime had to go to in order suppress the Green Movement took a toll on its coercive apparatus 
and it has relied on more subtle forms of repression lately, namely by mass disqualifications of 
candidates and judicial harassment of opponents. Even if the capacity to overthrow the regime 
were present among the opponents of the regime, the turmoil that has engulfed the region in the 
aftermath of the Arab Spring, has left little appetite for another revolution in Iran. Reform seems 
a much more promising path especially since the country might have a new Supreme Leader in the 
coming years.  
Economic malaise and political repression have made Iran the world leader in brain drain, 
with many thousands of highly educated college graduates leaving the country each year.209 
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Economic sanctions only serve to reinforce this pattern as the regime can blame the poor economy 
on an outside enemy. It can also silence dissent by claiming opponents are just agents of the enemy 
as well. According to Kenneth Pollack, “sanctions have an uneven record in general”210 as a 
landmark 1990 study of a 115 cases of sanctions being imposed, showed that they only have a 
success rate of about 34 percent. 211 Daniel Drezner has laid out what he calls the “sanctions 
paradox,” in which sanctions have a better rate of success in achieving the strategic goals of the 
imposing country if the target country is an ally and a democracy.212 The sanctions that led to the 
nuclear deal worked because they had a specific and very limited goal in mind,213 but more 
importantly, they worked because the Supreme Leader seems to have changed his mind based 
more on internal political calculations (his need to rebalance his power base) than any external 
threat. Moreover, the likelihood that we would be able to recreate such a sanctions regime for the 
purposes of regime change in Iran seems foolhardy at best. Much of the world is eager to tap into 
the lucrative Iranian market as evinced by the procession of trade delegations from Europe and 
Asia that started arriving in Iran even before the JCPOA was fully implemented. While US 
sanctions alone can do some damage, it will not be enough to put the survival of the regime at risk. 
It is this kind of opening that the hardliners find threatening and have been trying to limit its scope 
by targeting Iranians with dual nationality who are trying to reestablish business ties,214 and 
pursuing a ballistic missile program in contravention of UN resolutions.215  
                                                          
210 Kenneth Pollack, Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy, (New York, NY: Simon & Shuster, 2013): 152 
211 David A. Badlwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985) pp. 206-289 
212 Daniel Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999): 288 
213 For more on application of sanctions with a limited goal in mind see: Meghan O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions: 
Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism (Washington, DC: Brookings Institutions Press, 2002): 288 
214 Most recent examples include dual Iranian-British citizen Bahman Daroshafaei, American Iranians Siamak 
Namazi and his father 
215 Tim Hume and Alireza Hajihosseini, “Iran Fires Ballistic Missiles a day After Test; U.S. Officials Hint at Violation,” 
CNN March 9, 2016. http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/09/middleeast/iran-missile-test/  
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The biggest threat to the survival of the Iranian regime as an authoritarian Islamist entity 
is the lack of external threats. Khomeini’s ideology was anti-secularist (and by extension anti-
West) and to abandon that antagonism will be the end of Islamic Republic as the ideologically 
driven state that Khomeini had intended. The regime is also ignoring the demands of its own 
populace for a more open and democratic society, leading them to employ ever harsher measures 
to hold on to power. In Iran, it has long been conventional wisdom among regime elites that the 
Shah’s pusillanimous response in face of the street protests is what ultimately led to his 
downfall.216 As Abbas Milani points out, “Ironically, events since June 12, 2009, have shown that 
many of the top leaders in the Islamic regime, particularly Ayatollah Khamenei, seem to have 
drawn exactly the wrong conclusions about why the Shah fell”, because it wasn’t that he finally 
offered concessions to the protestors that undid his regime, rather that he offered them far too 
late.217 If the goal of US foreign policy is to see a change in the Iranian regime towards a more 
democratic form of government (as this paper will hopefully have illustrated that Iran has the 
potential for such a transition), then our policy should be crafted in a way that increases economic 
opportunity for young Iranians inside Iran. In practical terms this means fewer sanctions and more 
engagement, as both of these serve to undermine the regime’s political and economic narrative. 
Iran’s long quest for democracy spans more than a century and at no other time in its history has 
it had so many of the necessary components for achieving this goal. This is not to say that a 
democratic transition is an inevitability or that the regime is on the cusp of collapse. The Islamic 
Republic has proven time and again that it is far more resilient than its critics wish to acknowledge.   
                                                          
216 In reference to a televised speech Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi made on Nov. 20 1978 where he said "I heard 
the voice of your revolution ... Let all of us work together to establish real democracy in Iran ... I make a 
commitment to be with you and your revolution against corruption and injustice in Iran ..." 
217 Abbas Milani, “Iran’s Democratic Movements” in in Politics & Culture in Contemporary Iran, ed. Abbas Milani & 
Larry Diamond (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2015): 252 
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The regime has shown it is willing to make tactical concessions such as loosening the 
enforcement of moral restrictions, allowing a certain level of dissent among the regime elites, or 
even negotiating with their stated mortal enemy, the United States, in order to ultimately ensure 
the survival of the Islamic Republic’s system of government. The regime’s coercive apparatus is 
not as robust as it was prior to the 2009 protests, therefore it has had to rely on trying manage 
electoral conditions by disqualifying candidates it sees as threat, and making the aforementioned 
concessions when necessary. The results of the February 2016 mid-term elections seems to 
indicate that the hardline elements within the regime have overestimated their ability to manage 
the pace of change. Moreover, as a result of tactical voting by the reformist-pragmatist coalition, 
and the general disunity among the conservative factions, it is more difficult for the hardliners to 
roll back any tactical concessions they have had to make in order to stave off unrest without 
provoking a backlash. All these factors, combined with the looming end of Khamenei’s time as 
the Supreme Leader, make the authoritarian aspects of the regime especially vulnerable at this 
time, making reform a viable path to democratic transition. 
Given the failure of past attempts to dislodge the regime through popular uprisings, and 
the chaotic geopolitical situation engulfing the Middle East in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, 
there is very little appetite among Iranians for pursuing a revolutionary path in order to achieve 
the goals of creating a more democratic and pluralistic society. The Iranian people who wish to 
see such a change, view incremental reform through participation in the existing system of the 
Islamic Republic as the most feasible route to achieving their objectives. The process of gradual 
reform will either succeed in bringing Iran’s system of government closer to that of a liberal 
democracy, or it will expose the futility of seeking gradual change and pave the way for a more 
revolutionary approach. A revolution will only come about when it is clear that reform will not 
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bring about the changes the populace wants. While I have argued that Iran demographic and 
political conditions are favorable to the goals of reforming the existing system, this process of 
reform must be allowed to run its course, one way or the other. The goal of U.S. foreign policy 
should be to encourage these favorable trends by seeking more positive engagement opportunities 
with the more willing elements of the Iranian government. Hostile acts by the U.S. towards the 
regime such as the re-imposition of sanctions under a different guise, or the constant rhetoric of 
regime change emanating from all political corners, or not living up to the terms and spirit of the 
JCPOA, not only undermines our credibility in any future diplomatic efforts, it also creates further 
obstacles for the democratic movement in Iran as it plays directly into the narrative of the Iranian 
hardliners opposed to reform and rapprochement.  
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